After
Arafat
November 21st 2004
from our correspondent
in Bethlehem
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| We
all hope that a new era of peace is dawning in
the Middle East, but those who think the hope
is actually about to come true may have to think
again. |
Ever since the the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
foundered in September 2000, with the outbreak of Palestinian
violence, politicians and pundits have been searching
for a magical aid that would end the impasse and allow
the flowering of peace in the Middle East.
George Bush, Shimon
Peres, Shlomo Ben Ami and many others seem to think
that the death of Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat
will provide just such a deus ex machina, but there
may be little grounds for such optimism. While there
are too many unknowns to justify confident prediction
of what will happen, we can probably discern what
will not happen - real peace will not come any time
soon.
Many
Israelis and many in the US government developed a
personal animus to Arafat, who was blamed for the
failure of the peace negotiations as well as for blocking
efforts to stop terror. Now that Arafat is gone, it
will possible to unite all the security forces under
Ahmed Qurei or Mahmoud Abbas or another leader, and
perhaps the prospects for reducing terror activity
will improve. However, it is unlikely that Arafat's
exit will allow the rapid movement toward peace that
is predicted by many.
A
peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians would
have to look very much like the Geneva Accord or the
Ayalon-Nusseibeh agreement or any number of similar
documents. That is, Palestinians would need to renounce
their claim to the right of Palestinian refugees to
return to Israel, and Israel would have to withdraw
from all or most of the West Bank and Gaza strip,
including most of East Jerusalem, with minor border
corrections. This was the substance of the agreement
proposed by US President Clinton at Taba, which was
rejected by the Palestinians. It is doubtful if today
Israel would accept such an agreement either.
The
basic positions of the Palestinians and the Israelis
have not changed. The Palestinians are going to insist
on right of return for Palestinian refugees. The Fatah
Al-Aqsa brigades have already announced that they
would support Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) for the post
of Chairman of the Palestinian Authority only as long
as he continues to support Right of Return. Since
return of the Palestinian refugees to Israel would
soon establish an Arab majority, and would mean the
end of Israel as a Jewish state, it is unlikely that
even a minority of Israelis would agree to peace under
those conditions, or would even consider such a position
compatible with "peace." Israelis, for their part,
are reluctant to make the far-reaching territorial
concessions that would be demanded in a peace accord,
especially after the experience of the last four years
- a nightmare of suicide bombings in public places
and constant terror alerts - has demonstrated the
dangers of experimenting with concessions to Palestinians
as a means of catalyzing peace.
Israel
is likely to demand that the Palestinian leadership
take positive steps to reign-in terror groups by outlawing
them and arresting extremists, while Palestinian leaders
will try to reach truce agreements with groups like
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Fatah Al-Aqsa martyrs
brigades. Ariel Sharon would certainly be unwilling
to make the territorial concessions needed to bring
about a final peace. Paradoxically, Arafat's death
makes it harder for Palestinians to agree to a final
peace, because only someone with Arafat's prestige
and security in office could dare to sign off on the
major concessions that Palestinians would have to
make in order to obtain the much sought-after "historic
compromise." Ariel Sharon designed his disengagement
plan as a contingent strategy. That is, if the terror
continues, then Israel could ignore European and American
pressure for a settlement and treat the disengagement
as a strategic retreat.
If
the terror abates, European and American pressure
for a settlement would increase. In that case, the
disengagement could be viewed as an Israeli concession
in the framework of the roadmap for peace. Accordingly,
if all goes well, we can be moderately optimistic.
Following Palestinian elections, or perhaps even before,
Israel and the Palestinians will begin negotiations
on a revived peace process. In addition to the Gaza
withdrawal, the IDF will withdraw from Palestinian
cities and relax the closure. Palestinians will be
allowed to enter Israel.
At
the same time, the Palestinian Authority will ensure
that there is no revival of terror attacks. Israelis
and Palestinians will then hopefully be able to go
about their business in a more normal way. At a later
stage, Israel will withdraw from a larger portion
of the West Bank, and the Palestinians will be able
to declare a state with temporary borders. The eventual
peace will come not in a dramatic White House ceremony,
but in a gradual adaptation of each side to the other.
The
final stages will not be implemented by Ariel Sharon,
but by a more dovish leader, elected when and if the
Israeli public again has some confidence that Palestinians
mean to live in peace with Israel. Likewise on the
Palestinian side, some years will have to pass before
the residue of bitterness caused by the occupation,
and the old slogans of "revolution until victory"
represented by Arafat and his national liberation
movement ideology, are replaced by realism and trust.
Palestinian political life is still dominated by the
same armed groups, the same maximalist liberation
ideologies and most of the same people who were in
power during the Oslo years.
It
will be a long time before Palestinians develop the
sort of polity that can support a peace settlement.
